Allāh said in the Qurʾān:
يَٰٓأَيُّهَا اَ۬لذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓاْ أَطِيعُواْ اُ۬للَّهَ وَأَطِيعُواْ اُ۬لرَّسُولَ وَأُوْلِے اِ۬لَامْرِ مِنكُمْۖ فَإِن تَنَٰزَعْتُمْ فِے شَےْءٖ فَرُدُّوهُ إِلَى اَ۬للَّهِ وَالرَّسُولِ إِن كُنتُمْ تُومِنُونَ بِاللَّهِ وَالْيَوْمِ اِ۬لَاخِرِۖ ذَٰلِكَ خَيْرٞ وَأَحْسَنُ تَاوِيلاًۖ (النساء 59) 
“O you who believe, obey Allāh and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. Then, if you quarrel about something, revert it back to Allāh and the Messenger, if you believe in Allāh and the Last Day. That is good, and the best at the end.” (4:59)

For this ʾāyah, the Twelvers argued that, since the ʾāyah gives the same command of obedience towards the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم and those in authority, and gives no restriction to it, this means the command must be absolute for all of them, because we know that we are obligated to obey the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم in the absolute sense. Since anyone who must be obeyed in an absolute manner cannot command sin, they argued that this means “those in authority among you” must be infallible. 

We must begin by clarifying the different views of the scholars of the Salaf on who are meant by “those in authority”:¹ 

1. They are the ones in positions of legal authority, like rulers, judges, and military commanders. This is the view of ʾAbū Hurayrah رضي الله عنه, Zayd ibn ʾAslam, Ibn Zayd, as-Suddī, Maymūn ibn Mahrān, Muqātil, and al-Kalbī, and it is one of the narrations from Ibn ʿAbbās رضي الله عنهما, and this is the majority view. 
2. They are the scholars of the religion. This is the view of Jābir ibn ʿAbdillāh رضي الله عنه, al-ʾImām Mālik, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, aḍ-Ḍaḥḥāk, ʿAṭāʾ, ʾAbul-ʿĀlīyah, Ibn ʾAbī Najīḥ, and an-Nakhʿī, and it is also narrated from Mujāhid and Ibn ʿAbbās رضي الله عنهما. 
3. They are the Ṣaḥābah. This is one of the narrations from Mujāhid, and it is the view of Bakr ibn ʿAbdillāh al-Muzanī and at-Tabrīzī. 
4. They are ʾAbū Bakr and ʿUmar رضي الله عنهما. This is the view of ʿIkrimah. 
5. Many scholars sought to combine between these views, and took the ʾāyah to include all of these people and categories, and to be commanding obedience to each group in their respective domains, due to them all falling under the wording. 

The response to the Twelver claim that “those in authority” must be infallible ʾimāms is as follows: 

1.

It is not necessarily the case that “those in authority” being connected to the Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم using wāw al-ʿaṭf (translated in English using the word “and”) entails that all aspects of the obedience are the same. Rather, it only requires that both things share in the basic fundamental aspect of what the verb is stating, which is the command to obedience, and it does not necessarily require that both must share in the obedience being absolute. The majority of Sunnī scholars (excluding Ḥanafīs and a minority of scholars of other madhāhib) say that a condition being present for what is after the wāw does not necessarily require that the same condition be present for what is before the wāw, meaning that wāw al-ʿaṭf does not require sharing in all aspects between what comes before and after it.² The scholars of the Shīʿah seem to have widely differed among themselves on this issue.³ Even based on the minority Sunnī view, it would still be a ẓannī evidence open to contrary proofs.

The wording of the ʾāyah not containing an explicit restriction to the obedience is also a weak argument, since there is no disagreement that a general command from a text can be specified by external evidence. It is also not unreasonable to take the clause “if you quarrel about something, revert it back to Allāh and the Messenger” as a restriction on the obedience of “those in authority,” and the ʾaḥādīth narrated about the revelation of this ʾāyah all indicate that it was revealed in relation to military commanders appointed during the lifetime of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم, who were fallible by agreement, which gives a valid ẓannī justification for restricting the generality of the command.⁴ 

2.

The Twelver view necessitates that obedience to “those in authority among you” becomes conditional and not absolute, contradicting their own argument from the ʾāyah for why “those in authority” must be infallible.

Obedience to the ʾimāms is conditional on knowing them and being able to reach them, and we are unable to know and reach the 12th ʾImām. If this were not a condition in the command, it would necessitate that people are obligated with that which they cannot do, since the 12th ʾImām cannot be reached for judgments or commands to be taken from him, and there is agreement that such obligations do not occur. The Twelvers believe that even during the period of the occultation, the 12th ʾImām is still present among us, but that we are unaware of his identity.⁵ If he were to command a person with something, it would be impossible that the person be obligated to obey him, as the person has no way of knowing that the one commanding him is in fact the 12th ʾImām. Ash-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā confirms the conclusion that the 12th ʾImām cannot be obeyed during the period of Ghaybah.⁶ 

Additionally, according to the Twelver belief, their ʾimāms often practiced taqiyyah by giving false judgments and commands, in contrast to the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم, who by agreement never practiced taqiyyah. Being ordered to obey such commands in their apparent meaning is impossible, and Twelvers accept this. Being commanded to obey a hidden meaning for these commands would require people being burdened with that which they cannot bear, because in many cases, the person receiving the command has no way of knowing its supposed true intended meaning. An example of a command in taqiyyah would be when Jaʿfar aṣ-Ṣādiq commanded a woman with the wilāyah of ʾAbū Bakr and ʿUmar⁷ رضي الله عنهما, which we know is something that Twelvers say must not be followed. The cases of the ʾimāms commanding people of other sects based on the supposedly false beliefs of those groups are widespread in Twelver narrations, and this leads to the presence of many contradictory commands and rulings.⁸ There are many contradictory general commands given by the ʾimāms for which both cannot be followed at the same time, and a person is rather given the choice to follow one and not follow the other,⁹ and there are even cases where we have no way of knowing what command is taqiyyah and what isn’t.⁹

3.

Multiple aspects of the wording of “those in authority” also contradict the Twelver belief:

• Allāh commanded obedience to “those in authority”, which is a plural wording, and there can only be 1 ʾimām at any time. Taking a plural to be referring to an individual goes against the apparent and literal meaning. 
• This ʾāyah was revealed during the lifetime of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم, and the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم himself was the only one with the status of ʾImāmah then, whereas none of the ʾimāms of the Twelvers were in authority. 

4.

If “those in authority” were infallible ʾimāms, then those addressed in “if you quarrel about something, revert it back to Allāh and the Messenger” must either be only the ʾimāms, the ʾimāms and their followers, or only their followers. None of these can be reasonably applicable under the Twelver view.

• We know the first cannot be the case if the ʾimāms are said to be infallible, since infallibles cannot disagree on a judgment, and there is only one ʾimām at a time.
• The infallible ʾimāms’ followers do not have the authority to disagree with their judgment, and such a thing would be kufr. If there were to be a disagreement between the followers and the ʾimām, then the followers would be obligated to obey the ʾimām, rather than return it directly to Allāh and His Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم on their own. 
• As for claiming the disagreement is only among the followers, then this is also far-fetched. From the grammatical perspective, the default would be the inclusion of “those in authority,” since they are referred to as being “among” those who are addressed. Excluding them requires evidence, which is not clearly present in the ʾāyah. Also, if this interpretation were the case, the followers would have to be ordered to return the matter to the infallible ʾimām who has the authority to give a definitive judgment based on the Qurʾān and Sunnah and clarify the disputed issue, whereas those addressed would have no authority to do such a thing in his presence, especially since the generality of those addressed are laymen who do not even have any authority to derive rulings. 
• Commanding people to refer back to Allāh and the Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم requires that they must derive a new ruling from the Qurʾān and the Sunnah through their own fallible ijtihād (judgment through independent reasoning), which by definition requires qiyās (analogical reasoning). This is because things that are mentioned in the Qurʾān and Sunnah are already included in the previous commands to obey Allāh and obey the Messenger صلى الله عليه وسلم, so this must be referring to matters that had not been previously mentioned, which would require qiyās to determine their rulings. The Twelvers reject the authority of qiyās, and say that unclear matters must be referred back to the ʾimām to be clarified, thereby going against the indication of the ʾāyah. Additionally, laymen are not even qualified to do ijtihād at all, and the vast majority of those being addressed in the passage would be laymen.

5.

The Twelvers claimed that { وَإِذَا جَآءَهُمُۥٓ أَمْرٞ مِّنَ اَ۬لَامْنِ أَوِ اِ۬لْخَوْفِ أَذَاعُواْ بِهِۦۖ وَلَوْ رَدُّوهُ إِلَى اَ۬لرَّسُولِ وَإِلَيٰٓ أُوْلِے اِ۬لَامْرِ مِنْهُمْ لَعَلِمَهُ اُ۬لذِينَ يَسْتَنۢبِطُونَهُۥ مِنْهُمْۖ وَلَوْلَا فَضْلُ اُ۬للَّهِ عَلَيْكُمْ وَرَحْمَتُهُۥ لَاتَّبَعْتُمُ اُ۬لشَّيْطَٰنَ إِلَّا قَلِيلاًۖ } “When news concerning peace or fear comes to them, they go about spreading it. Had they referred it to the Messenger and to those having authority among them, the truth of the matter would have come to the knowledge of those of them who are able to investigate. But for Allāh’s grace upon you, and mercy, you would have followed Satan, save a few.” (4:83) proves that returning the matter to those in authority is the same as returning it to the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم. In reality, this ʾāyah refutes their claim.

• The phrase { لَعَلِمَهُ اُ۬لذِينَ يَسْتَنۢبِطُونَهُۥ مِنْهُمْۖ } “the truth of the matter would have come to the knowledge of those of them who are able to investigate” linguistically ought to be referring to people among those in authority, and not people from the original group being referred to at the beginning of the ʾāyah. Linguistic tafāsīr such as those of az-Zamakhsharī¹⁰ and ʾAbū Ḥayyān,¹¹ and Šīʿī tafāsīr such as those of aṭ-Ṭūsī¹² and aṭ-Ṭabrisī¹³ affirm this. Ar-Rāzī¹⁴ also explains why this must be the case linguistically.
• This ʾāyah speaks about those in authority during the time of the ʾāyah being revealed, at which time al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn رضي الله عنهما were either small children or not yet born. This makes it highly unlikely for it to refer to the ʾimāms of the Twelvers, as not only are those in authority plural (and not dual or singular), but even those among them who are doing the istinbāṭ (drawing conclusions) are plural (and not dual or singular). Furthermore, none were in the position of ʾImāmah during the lifetime of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم. 
• The term istinbāṭ in this ʾāyah can only refer to qiyās to determine judgments, the validity of which is rejected by Twelvers, and is not even possible for those who already have total knowledge of the rulings of the Sharīʿah as Twelvers believe about their ʾimāms. The ʾāyah indicates that those doing the istinbāṭ did not have prior knowledge of the ruling they derive, but rather gain the knowledge through the act of doing istinbāṭ, while the Twelvers believe the ʾimāms must already have total knowledge of the rulings of the religion. The term istinbāṭ in Arabic refers to deriving something out of something else, which in relation to judgments and rulings in religion, cannot refer to anything but qiyās, as qiyās by definition is deriving rulings on new matters based on analogy from the texts of the Qurʾān and Sunnah. As for the matters referred to here, then it says “concerning peace or fear,” and peace and fear are related to all things that people are held responsible for, indicating that this is general for all matters. There is no reason to restrict this to a specific case and not another. 

6.

The Twelvers also claimed that the term “those in authority” cannot be in reference to scholars, since they are not in a position of authority over people. This argument is weak ,since it is obligatory upon people to follow the statements of the scholars due to their knowledge about Allāh’s commands and prohibitions, and it is not far-fetched at all for them to be referred to as being in authority in this sense. This is established by the ʾāyah { وَمَا كَانَ اَ۬لْمُومِنُونَ لِيَنفِرُواْ كَآفَّةٗۖ فَلَوْلَا نَفَرَ مِن كُلِّ فِرْقَةٖ مِّنْهُمْ طَآئِفَةٞ لِّيَتَفَقَّهُواْ فِے اِ۬لدِّينِ وَلِيُنذِرُواْ قَوْمَهُمُۥٓ إِذَا رَجَعُوٓاْ إِلَيْهِمْ لَعَلَّهُمْ يَحْذَرُونَۖ } “It is not (necessary) for all the believers to go forth.’; So, why should it not be that a group from every section of them goes forth, so that they may acquire perfect understanding of the Faith, and so that they may warn their people when they return to them, so that they may take due care (of the rules of Sharīʿah).” (9:122) This indicates that the people must accept and take the statements of the people of tafaqquh (understanding) in the religion. It is entirely reasonable for them to be referred to as “those in authority” from this perspective. Also, historically, albeit to a much lesser extent today, the actions of the rulers have generally been dependent on the judgments of scholars. In this sense, scholars can be considered in charge of the rulers themselves, which makes it even more reasonable for them to be referred to as being in authority.

7.

Some Twelvers objected to the view that “those in authority” are the scholars by saying that a command to obey a group of people being in the plural does not mean you must only obey them when they agree. This is a strawman, as those holding this view do not say that obedience is limited to when they agree. Rather, on all matters of the Sharʿ (rulings of the religion), the scholars must be followed. When the scholars disagree, a person must remain within the set of opinions held by the scholars. This does not negate the obedience being absolute, as the scholars must still be followed in all of these matters. 

The following concluding judgements can be made:

If we say that “those in authority” cannot be those who can command mistakes, then what follows would be that they refer to the scholars as a whole, the consensus of whom is infallible. This fits much better with the ʾāyah, as following ʾijmāʿ is absolutely unrestricted, and the scholars are both plural and present during the time of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم and all other times. There are also many examples of judgments of ʾijmāʿ that are based on ijtihād/qiyās without direct mention in the Qurʾān and Sunnah.¹⁵ With regards to the clause in the end of the ʾāyah, this view would fit perfectly with it, as the disagreement would then be among those in authority themselves due to iltifāt (switching of the subject of the verb), so it would be saying that when the scholars disagree and don’t have ʾijmāʿ, they must use qiyās to determine the proper judgment. This part of the ʾāyah also gives a strong implication of ʾijmāʿ being giving precedence over the quarrel/disagreement that is being referred to. 

Those who held the view that “those in authority” are those in positions of command said that they were mentioned after the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم to indicate that their obedience is not inherent or independent. Rather, it is done as an extension of obedience to the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم, and is dependent on the obedience of those people to Allāh and the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم. If the command to obey “those in authority” is taken as conditional, then it is much more reasonable to take the previous ʾāyah which commands justice in judgments, and the clause in the later part of this ʾāyah which commands returning to the Qurʾān and Sunnah when disagreement occurs, as indications for the condition.

ʾĀṣif Muḥsinī, in Ṣirāṭ al-Ħaqq, after bringing up the argument from the ʾāyah, weakened it, saying:¹⁶ “I say: its response has already been mentioned. And command of obedience without giving a restriction does not indicate infallibility as it had been imagined, rather it is restricted by the requirement of completing obligations and avoiding prohibitions that occur for morally responsible people based on combining all the evidences, especially knowing that the apparent of the ʾāyah with the contextual evidence of ‘among you’ is that what is intended is people of authority during the time of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم and it is certain that these people were not all infallible. And here there are other arguments used as proof by our scholars for the claim but they are also not free from dispute and objection so take note of their tafāsīr and their books of ʿIlm al-Kalām.” 

In this, Muḥsinī was in agreement with ash-Sharīf al-Murtaḍā, who states that the scholars of the Shīʿah in his time did not rely on this ʾāyah to argue for the requirement of infallibility or of naṣṣ for the ʾimāms, and that such an argument would not be valid.¹⁷ It is also interesting to note that many preeminent modern scholars of the Shīʿah who promote the doctrine of Wilāyat al-Faqīh claim that the Faqīh in question is included in those in authority mentioned in this verse, even though he is not infallible and has no naṣṣ appointing him, and even that many scholars not explicitly promoting this doctrine make fallible scholars and leaders included within those in authority who are mentioned in the ʾāyah.¹⁸ 

1.  تفسير الطبري , تفسير ابن عطية , البحر المحيط لأبي حيان , تفسير الماوردي ,  زاد المسير لابن الجوزي 
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2.  البحر المحيط للزركشي – مسألة عطف الخاص على العام , الأوسط لابن المنذر – باب ذكر قتل المؤمن بالكافر , شرح المحلي على جمع الجوامع مع حاشية العطار – ج2 ص22 
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3.  مبادئ الوصول للعلامة الحلي – ص150 , الموسوعة الفقهية الميسرة للأنصاري – ج2 ص294 
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4.  الدر المنثور للسيوطي 
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5.  https://aqaed.net/faq/2641/ 
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6.  المقنع في الغيبة للشريف المرتضى – 252 
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7.  معجم الأحاديث المعتبرة لآصف محسني – الكتاب الثالث – الباب #79 – الحديث #1 
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8.  الذكرى للشهيد الأول – ص6 , تهذيب الأحكام للشيخ الطوسي – ج1 ص2 , المجتنى لابن طاووس – ص25 , الإمامة والتبصرة لابن بابويه القمي – ص10 , مصباح الفقاهة للخوئي – ج1 ص632 
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9.  معجم الأحاديث المعتبرة لآصف محسني – الكتاب الثاني – الباب #10 
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10.  الحدائق الناضرة للمحقق البحراني – ج1 ص5 
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11.  الكشاف للزمخشري 
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12.  البحر المحيط لأبي حيان 
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13.  التبيان للطوسي 
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14.  مجمع البيان للطبرسي 
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15.  تفسير الرازي 
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16.  الإحكام للآمدي – مسألة جواز انعقاد الإجماع عن الاجتهاد والقياس
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17.  صراط الحق لآصف محسني – ج2 ص27 
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18.  الشافي للشريف المرتضى – ج2 ص257 
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19.  صحیفه امام خمینی – ج12 ص409 , اقتصادنا لمحمد باقر الصدر – ص327 , مهذب الأحكام لعبد الأعلى السبزواري – ج11 ص244 , دراسات المنتظري – ج1 ص575 , من هدى القرآن لمحمد تقي المدرسي – ج2 ص73  
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